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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the financial cointegration and spillover
effect of the global financial crisis to emerging Asian financial
markets (India, China, Pakistan, Malaysia, Russia and Korea). The
analysis used daily stock returns, divided into three time periods:
pre-, during and post-crisis from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2015. We
applied the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test, the vector
error correction model (V.E.C.M.) and the G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model
for an examination of integration and conditional volatility. We
find long-term cointegration between the U.S. market and emerg-
ing stock markets, and the level of cointegration increased after
the crisis period. The V.E.C.M. and impulse response function
reveal that a shock in the U.S. financial market has a short-term
impact on the returns of emerging financial markets. Past shocks
and volatility have more effect on the selected stock markets dur-
ing all time periods. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index and
the Bombay stock exchange (B.S.E.) are the only stock markets
that have cross-market news and volatility spillover effects during
the crisis period. After the crisis period, news effects are positive
on the B.S.E. and the Russian Trading System and have a negative
effecton the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Shanghai
Stock Exchange.
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1. Introduction
In the 1900s the financial liberalisation of capital inflow and the stock markets was
followed by a boom in the number of cross-border transactions of currencies and
securities. Later, with financial globalisation, the world has become a global village,
where assets can be traded in any part of the world in no time and without
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restrictions. Such a high interdependence of economies has increased the effects when
shocks in one economy spill over to the rest of the world. The global financial crisis
of 2007–2009, which originated in the U.S. financial sector due to the fall of the U.S.
real estate market, is the worst financial crisis after the great depression of the 1930s,
and spread rapidly to almost all emerging and advanced economies (Claessens,
Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2010). It affected equity markets around the world, and
many emerging economies observed a very sharp decline in their equity markets,
greater than that of the U.S. stock market. This catastrophe also showed an extreme
case of financial collapse that stretched to other European and emerging Asian econo-
mies, whereas Asian economies were somehow able to manage the negative effects of
these financial shocks. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 initi-
ated the global financial crisis, which quickly spread to other emerging economies
(Dooley & Hutchison, 2009).
‘Spillover of shocks’ is a buzzword after the global financial crisis, so it is import-
ant to understand the meaning of spillover. In the field of finance, the terms spill-
over, contagion, co-movement and cointegration are commonly used
interchangeably. Contagion has been defined in various ways by researchers in the
field. The World Bank (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000) defines contagion by
classifying it in three levels. The first definition gives a broader view, and defines
contagion as cross-countries transmission of the spillover effect or the transmission
of cross-country shocks. This spillover can happen in both good and bad times, and
is not only related to a crisis period. The second definition is restrictive in nature,
which states that contagion is the co-movement of shocks. This is commonly
explained by herding behaviour. The third definition is more restrictive, which
states that contagion is greater during a ‘crisis time’ when there is an increase in
the cross-countries correlations relative to correlations during a ‘tranquil time’,
which is the transmission of the spillover effect during a post-crisis period. The
contagion effect is defined as an increase in volatility spillover between two financial
markets after a financial crisis (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). Co-movements among
financial markets indicate the presence of alike trends in the financial markets.
Economic integration and stock market characteristics are the main factors explain-
ing co-movement among financial markets (Pretorius, 2002). Co-movement and
cointegration are synonymous terms, because they depict the existence of long-run
trends among the financial markets, whereas a change in correlations among finan-
cial markets is defined as interconnectedness.
Emerging Asian economies have played a vital role in catering to the effects of
financial crises. Over the years, the emerging Asian financial markets have proved to
be the new drivers of change in the world. China and India have the capacity to
transform the global economy in the twenty-first century (Engardio, 2007). The
Bombay Stock Exchange (B.S.E.) is one of South Asia’s oldest and fastest growing
stock exchanges. It is the world’s tenth largest stock market, with a market capitalisa-
tion at $1.68 trillion (March 2015) and over 5500 listed companies (World Federation
of Exchanges and the B.S.E., 2016). Pakistan has always been a key market economic-
ally and strategically. In 2014 the K.S.E.-100 Index (a proxy of the Pakistani stock
market) gained 6870 points from 25,261 to 32,131, generating a handsome return of
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27 percent (31 percent return in US$ terms) for investors. Gross domestic product
(G.D.P.) growth was recorded at 4.24 percent in the fiscal year 2014–2015 as com-
pared to 4.03 percent last year (2013-14). During the financial turmoil of 2007-2009,
the U.S. equity market lost about 40 percent of its market capitalisation. On the other
hand, the Russian equity market loss was about 52 percent, which was much higher
than that of the U.S. equity market. The U.S. financial sector, though, lost around 60
percent, but less than the Russian financial sector (Dungey & Gajurel, 2014). In the
last decade (2000-2010), the Malaysian and Korean economies have been the best
emerging economies in the Asian region due to an increase in liberalisation, trade
openness, financial integration and tremendous development in the financial sector.
This perhaps increased the chances of the Malaysian and Korean stocks markets hav-
ing spillover effects generated by the global financial crisis.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extreme events of the global finan-
cial crisis (2007–2009) and its spillover effects on a few Asian emerging economies.
An extensive literature is available on the effect of the global financial crisis on stock
markets, for example Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), Baur (2012), Beirne,
Caporale, Schulze-Ghattas and Spagnolo (2010), Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic and
Sarno (2012), Guo, Chen and Huang (2011), and Kenourgios and Padhi (2012).
Furthermore, in the literature more importance has been given to the developed
economies, as in the studies by Huang, Yuang and Hu (2000), Kenourgios, Samitas
and Paltalidis (2011) and Syllignakis and Kouretas (2010, 2011). To achieve the objec-
tives of this study, the sample consists of daily data from U.S. stock returns (as the
crisis originated in the U.S. financial market) and the six large emerging economies
from the Asian region, namely India, Pakistan, China, South Korea, Russia and
Malaysia. Separate samples have been analysed for the pre-, during and post-crisis
periods in order to identify the changing patterns in the cointegration and volatility
spillover among the stock markets of six Asian markets and the U.S. market. This
will provide a better understanding of the impact of the global financial crisis
(G.F.C.) on the integration and interconnectedness of these Asian markets with the
U.S. market. The reason for selecting these emerging economies is that these econo-
mies are totally cohesive with major financial markets of the world. There can be a
strong chance of spillover effects of the global financial crisis on these Asian
Economies. We are mainly concerned with the following questions: 1) Are the stock
markets of selected Asian countries long-term cointegrated with the U.S. financial
market? 2) Is there any financial spillover effect of the global financial crisis on the
stock markets of emerging Asian countries? 3) What is the present cointegration level
of these Asian stock markets? This study is novel in its kind due to its objectives and
the selection of major Asian economies. To the best of our efforts we have not found
any other study that has selected these emerging Asian economies, completely focus-
ing on the above objectives.
These research questions provide significant information for portfolio managers,
investors and policymakers. By knowing the extent of integration and vulnerability of
the emerging Asian markets to financial shocks in the U.S. stock market, investors
and portfolio managers can make sound decisions related to portfolio diversification.
Policymakers in these Asian economies, by using the findings of this study, can focus
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their attention on developments in the U.S. financial markets while developing strat-
egies to protect their markets from the negative effects of any future financial crisis.
The results of this study provide evidence of a significant spillover effect from the
U.S. stock market (New York Stock Exchange, N.Y.S.E.) to emerging Asian stock
markets during pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis time periods. Using multivariate ana-
lysis, we have found that all of the statistical techniques like Johansen and Juselius,
vector error correction, impulse response and the multivariate generalised autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity-Babe, Engel, Kraft and Kroner (1991) (G.A.R.C.H.-
B.E.K.K.) model found a spillover effect from the N.Y.S.E. onto the emerging econo-
mies in all three time periods. Qiao, Qiao and Wong (2010), Valls and Chulia (2012),
and Worthington and Higgs (2006) have also used these models to analyse the spill-
over effects for different stock exchanges. In this study, we have not only tested the
spillover effects, but also checked the cointegration between the markets. Overall,
the results of this study are consistent with previous studies on the spillover effect of
the global financial crisis (Aloui, Aïssa, & Nguyen, 2011; Balli, Hajhoj, Basher, &
Ghassan, 2015; Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, & Mehl, 2014; Dooley & Hutchison,
2009; Dungey & Gajurel, 2014; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2015; Lin, 2012; Syllignakis &
Kouretas, 2010, 2011). The paper is organised as follows. The next section is a litera-
ture review of cointegration of stock markets and financial spillover effects; section 3
is about the data and methodology used for data analysis, section 4 contains the data
source and sampling; the empirical results and discussion are summarised in section
5; and conclusions are presented in section 6.
2. Literature review
The increase in the level of cointegration and co-movement of different stocks and
stock markets is not considered to be good for portfolio diversification as it is against
the principles of portfolio theory presented by the great Nobel Laureate Harry
Markowitz (1952), later extended by Sharpe (1963). The integrated stocks and stock
markets move (up and down) together as happened in the Asian crisis (1997) and the
U.S. financial crisis (2008), restricting the diversification benefits of portfolio making.
The concept of international portfolio diversification was introduced by Solnik
(1974). He also extends the domestic capital asset pricing model into an international
context, and suggests that the investor can get higher profit with lesser risk from
international portfolios as compared to domestic portfolio. In an earlier period due to
less cointegration, several researchers have empirically found weak correlations
among the stock indexes of countries and their economies, i.e., Errunza (1977),
Grubel (1968), Hilliard (1979), Lessard (1974, 1976), Levy and Sarnat (1970), Panton,
Lessig and Joy (1976) and Ripley (1973). This weak correlation provided a good
environment for getting the benefits of international portfolio diversification.
Later, globalisation (due to capital market liberalisation) and free trade agreements
transformed the developed and developing economies into a more integrated stature.
The speedy transfer of information and capital led to decreased benefits of inter-
national diversification in the long run due to an increase in the level of cointegra-
tion. Furthermore, the events of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the global
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financial crisis in the early years of the twenty-first century provided extended evi-
dence of integrated stock markets and their worst consequences for portfolio invest-
ments. The developing countries are now becoming more helpless in the face of
uncertainties in international flows of funds than ever before (Stiglitz 2003). After the
crises, researchers have been more cautious about the integration and co-movement
of stock markets due to their spillover effects. This integration and its effects on glo-
bal stock markets have been recognised by numerous researchers, i.e., Abad, Chulia,
& Gomez-Puig (2010), Beirne et al. (2010), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Huang et al.
(2000), Kizys and Pierdzioch (2009), Liang, Chen and Yang (2015), Lucey and Zhang
(2010), Masih and Masih (1999) and Tuluca and Zwick (2001).
In this regard, several comprehensive studies have been conducted to check this
phenomenon. For example, a study by Huyghebaert and Wang (2010) on seven major
stock markets of Asia was conducted to find the integration and interdependencies
among the stock markets before, during and after the 1997–1998 Asian financial cri-
sis. The results revealed that the relationships among East Asian stock markets were
time-varying while stock market interactions were limited before the Asian financial
crisis started. Graham, Kiviaho and Nikkinen (2012) revealed in their comprehensive
study a low degree of co-movement between the U.S. and the 22 individual emerging
markets. and that the degree of stock market integration was changing over time. Lin
(2012) revealed that the Asian emerging markets have strong co-movement between
exchange rates and stock prices during crisis periods. Bae and Zhang (2015), however,
exposed that stock market integration was evident only in emerging countries in the
financial crises of 1997 and 2008. Notably, the literature mentioned above reveals
mixed results: some researchers have found that stock markets were integrated in the
short run (in a specific period), and others argued that the co-movements among
financial markets were only in the long run. Therefore, it is necessary to find evi-
dence whether the selected emerging stock markets are cointegrated or not.
Accepting the importance of spillover effects on the financial markets, economists
have not yet developed a consensus on the presence of spillover during the financial
crisis. Literature is available documenting the effects of financial contagion on different
regions of the world: see the seminal papers by Bekaert et al. (2014), Chakrabarti and
Roll (2002), Dooley and Hutchison (2009), Dungey and Gajurel (2014), Kim et al.
(2015) and Syllignakis and Kouretas (2010, 2011). Dooley and Hutchison (2009) found
that the financial and economic news originating from the U.S. had a statistically and
economically large impact on the selected emerging markets. Moreover, news or events
caused homogeneous movements between the stock markets. Syllignakis and Kouretas
(2010, 2011) provided evidence that the stock markets of the Central and Eastern
European countries were partially integrated with the developed stock markets of the
U.S. and Germany. Moreover, there were strong contagion effects among the U.S.,
German, Russian and Central and Eastern European (CEE) stock markets.
Dungey and Gajurel (2014) provided strong evidence of contagion effects on both
emerging as well as on advanced equity markets. For financial sector indices, how-
ever, the results are slightly different. Particularly in the case of advanced markets,
there is a weak indication of contagion in the aggregate indices. Kim et al. (2015)
supported the findings of Eichengreen et al. (2012) that financial contagion was
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triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In addition, the
findings suggested a dominant and significant role of foreign investment for the con-
ditional correlations in international equity markets. The dollar London inter-bank
offered rate-overnight indexed swap (Libor-O.I.S.) spread, the sovereign credit default
swap (CDS) premium and foreign investment are found to be dynamic factors affect-
ing foreign exchange markets. Bekaert et al. (2014) recognised the small effect of con-
tagion from the U.S. market to the global financial sector during the crisis, and it did
not spread extensively across countries and sectors. Further, they found that the
countries suffering from high unemployment, great political risk and a huge deficit in
both the government budget and current account balance experienced a high magni-
tude of contagion. Lucey and Voronkova (2008) found that in the long run the
Russian equity market remained isolated from the influence of several developed
international markets as well as the equity markets of Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Poland, before and after the 1998 crisis. Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan
(2014), in their comprehensive study of 58 countries, documented that there are no
significant contagion effects derived from the U.S. stock markets, either at world level
and or at a regional level. Moreover, their results suggested that there was a spillover
effect of the U.S. sub-prime crisis on selected markets rather than contagion to most
of the countries. This effect was transmitted and spread to some main countries like
Singapore and the U.K. Wang (2014) discovered that East Asian stock markets were
less sensitive to the shocks in the U.S. after the crisis.
The seminal examples of Brazil, Russia, India and China (B.R.I.C.)/Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa (B.R.I.C.S.) studies are Aloui et al. (2011), Dimitriou,
Kenourgios and Simos (2013), Kenourgios et al. (2011) and Syriopoulos, Makram and
Boubaker (2015). These studies presented mix results for the contagion effect during
the global financial crisis. Aloui et al. (2011) found evidence of strong co-movement
between the B.R.I.C. markets and the U.S. market during the crisis period. The mag-
nitude of contagion effects is more in the cases of Brazil and Russia (commodity pri-
ces-dependent economies) compared to emerging markets, like China and India
(finished products export-oriented countries). Kenourgios et al. (2011) confirmed the
contagion effects of five different financial crises during 1997–2002 on B.R.I.C., U.S.
and U.K. stock markets, while the emerging stock markets have greater financial con-
tagion effects. Their study was, however, unlikely to cover the global financial crisis
of 2008. A recent study by Syriopoulos et al. (2015) on B.R.I.C.S. economies also con-
firmed the evidence for volatility and shock spillover between India, Russia, Brazil
and the U.S. stock markets and business sectors during the 2008 financial crisis. The
study by Dimitriou et al. (2013) did not find any evidence of contagion effects of the
U.S. financial crisis on B.R.I.C.S. economies till mid-2008, whereas the economies
later re-emerged with the U.S. market in early 2009.
In the literature above, several researchers have recognised the contagion and spill-
over effects of the global financial crisis on stock markets around the world. These
studies are, however, mostly based on developed stock markets, and very little
importance and response has been given to emerging markets. For example, Wang
(2014) has selected six East Asian developed markets (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea and Japan) for a cointegration check. These markets are
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already well integrated with the rest of the world. Therefore, there is a chance of
strong contagion effects among these economies. Syllignakis and Kouretas (2010,
2011) has only focused on Central and Eastern European countries, while Kim et al.
(2015) have examined five emerging economies (Indonesia, Korea, Philippine,
Thailand and Taiwan) that were badly affected in the 1997 Asian crisis. Kenourgios
and Padhi (2012) selected emerging market economies from various regions (Latin
America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa) to check the spillover effects of
the crisis. Moreover, the studies that mainly concentrated on B.R.I.C.S. economies
have overlooked the importance of other emerging economies, specifically the coun-
tries that were selected for this study (i.e., Malaysia, South Korea and Pakistan).
Furthermore, numerous studies have focused only on pre-crisis and crisis time peri-
ods (e.g., Chakrabarti and Roll, 2002 and Morales & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2014).
The spillover effect has not, however, been measured after the financial crisis period,
to check whether the emerging stock markets adjust to normal conditions or not.
The focus of this study is to find long-term cointegration of emerging stock markets
with the U.S. stock market, and the spillover effects of the global financial crisis on
emerging Asian markets. The novel feature of this research is that it concentrates on
the reactions of the stock markets of emerging Asian economies before, during and
after the global financial crisis. This study makes an ample contribution to the exist-
ing literature on the spillover effects of financial crises.
3. Methodology
In this study we are mainly concerned with the following three questions in pre-,
during and post-global financial crisis time periods. 1) Are the stock markets of
selected countries long-term cointegrated with the U.S. financial market? 2) Is there
any financial spillover effect on the stock markets of emerging Asian markets? 3)
What is the present cointegration level of these stock markets?
The Johansen and Juselius cointegration test is applied to investigate the first
research question by testing the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.1: There exists long-run cointegration among the emerging Asian stock
markets and the U.S. stock market before the G.F.C.;
Hypothesis 2.1: There exists long-run cointegration among the emerging Asian stock
markets and the U.S. stock market during the G.F.C.
The multivariate G.A.R.C.H. (M.G.A.R.C.H.)-B.E.K.K. model is used to test the fol-
lowing hypothesis for the second research question of the study:
Hypothesis 3.1: There exists volatility among the emerging Asian stock markets and the
U.S. stock market before the G.F.C.;
Hypothesis 4.1: There exists volatility among the emerging Asian stock markets and the
U.S. stock market during the G.F.C.
The third research question is answered by applying both Johansen and Juselius
cointegration and the M.G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model to the post-crisis sample to test
the following two hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 5.1: There exists long-run cointegration among the emerging Asian stock
markets and the U.S. stock market after the G.F.C.;
Hypothesis 6.1: There exists volatility among the emerging Asian stock markets and the
U.S. stock market post-G.F.C.
The main motivation for selecting the cointegration framework is that the stock
series that are estimated to hold a long-run relationship must be stationary at their
first difference or non-stationary at level. It is the requirement of the classic regres-
sion model that all the selected variables (dependent and independent) must be sta-
tionary. Moreover, the errors have a finite variance and zero mean. Granger and
Newbold (1977) documented that if a series is non-stationary, then all of the typical
regression outcomes might be spurious. In order to avoid the problem of spurious
regression, first of all we have to analyse the time series properties of the selected var-
iables. This could be observed by applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller (A.D.F.) test
(Dickey & Fuller, 1979, 1981). The A.D.F. model is employed to check the unit root
as follows:
DYt ¼ a0 þ dYt1 þ b1DYt1 þ b2DYt2 þ :::þ bpDYtp þ et
There are two types of tests that are mostly used for cointegration. One was pro-
posed by Engle and Granger (E.G.) (Engle & Granger, 1987), and the other was pro-
posed by Johansen and Juselius (1990). The later one is considered to be superior
from the E.G. test, as it provides the most consistent and accurate results of cointe-
gration. Since it corrects some of the shortcomings of the E.G. test, mainly due to
being a two-step test in which the errors in the first step are carried over to the
second step, we can apply restrictions to the cointegrating vectors, and are less con-
cerned about the exogeny of the explanatory variables (Gulzar, Feng & Yajie, 2007).
Actually, the test proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) for cointegration is based
on the maximum likelihood estimators of a vector auto regressive process, and the
two different likelihood ratio tests that test the pre-established correlations between
the selected variables. The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics are two different
likelihood ratio tests that are computed as follows:





kmax r; r þ 1ð Þ ¼ T ln 1 k̂rþ1
 
where ktraceðrÞ represents the trace statistic, kmaxðr; r þ 1Þ is the maximum eigenvalue
statistic, T is the sample size, and k̂j and ki þ 1^ symbolise the estimated eigenvalue of
the specific roots found from the matrix. The null hypothesis of r cointegrating vec-
tors against n cointegrating vectors is determined through trace statistics, while the
null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of rþ 1
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cointegrating vectors is measured through maximum eigenvalue statistics (Gupta and
Guidi, 2012; Yoon and Kang, 2011).
To analyse the impact of the global financial crisis on the stock markets of selected
economies, the vector auto-regression (V.A.R.) model has been selected. The V.A.R.
model measures causality among the stock returns. All variables in a V.A.R. model
are taken as endogenous variables, whereas the V.A.R. model is a multi-equation sys-
tem. So, there is one equation for each dependent variable, and each equation has
lagged values for all the included variables as independent variables. Huang and Feng
(2007) and Zalduendo (2006) have carried out similar analyses using V.A.R. in their
studies. If cointegration does not exist, then we have applied a V.A.R. model. In con-
trast, it could also be modelled through the vector error correction model (V.E.C.M.)
if cointegration exists between yt and xt.
While calculating the V.A.R. model we are generally interested in investigating the
impulse response function. This tells us the integration level of selected stock mar-
kets. An exogenous shock that directly affects a stock market is not only affecting
that single stock market, but is also transmitted to other stock markets. An impulse
response function measures the effects of a one-unit exogenous shock to the change
of the increase or decrease in the current and future value of the other stock markets.
If there is a response of one stock market to an impulse on another stock market
than the first stock market has causality with other stock markets. Several authors fol-
lowed Sim’s (Sim, 1980) study of a V.A.R. model that was carried out using
‘orthogonalised’ impulse responses. In this method, the error variance decompositions
were computed before the computation of a impulse response forecast. Koop, Pesaran
and Potter (1996) proposed impulse response for the analysis of nonlinear multivari-
ate models. Both techniques, however, required orthogonalisation of the shocks.
Later, Pesaran and Shin (1998) extended the work of Koop et al. (1996) and sug-
gested a generalised impulse response analysis for unrestricted V.A.R. and cointe-
grated V.A.R. models. This technique does not carry any of the shortcoming of the
models proposed by Sims (1980) and Koop et al. (1996). In this paper, for the ana-
lysis of current market conditions, we have applied the impulse response function
proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998). This will satisfy our third question regarding
the present cointegration level of these stock markets.
To deal with the second issue, the researchers divided the sample period into two
parts (pre- and post-crisis period) and used an unconditional cross-market correlation
coefficients approach. If there is a significant increase in the correlation coefficients
during crisis, then it suggests that there is a contagion effect. This type of approach
has also been used by Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), King and Wadhwani (1990),
Le (1991), Lee and Kim (1993) and Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) for the U.S. market
crash in 1987; and Calvo and Reinhart (1996) for the 1994 Mexican peso crisis.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued that these tests might suffer from the problem of
heteroskedasticity (bias) because they were based on comparisons of sub-sample cor-
relation coefficients. Moreover, many other researchers also used the G.A.R.C.H. fam-
ily test to identify the crisis effect (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 2003 and Hamao,
Masulis, & Ng, 1990). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) further pointed out that the autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (A.R.C.H.) and G.A.R.C.H. frameworks were
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used for analysing market co-movements, and that the results showed the variance
and covariance transmission mechanisms between economies. The researchers were
much interested in the permanent change in the unconditional variance rather than
the conditional one. This issue has been solved by the dynamic conditional correl-
ation (D.C.C.) M.G.A.R.C.H. model.
Several researchers have recently used the D.C.C. M.G.A.R.C.H. model developed
by Engle (2002). This approach was used by Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006),
Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007), Dimitriou and Kenourgios (2013), Dimitriou et al. (2013)
and Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011). This is a multivariate model for estimating
time-varying conditional correlations, and it does not require knowledge of the spe-
cific date when the contagion occurs. Engle further claims that this test performs bet-
ter in different situations and provides utilitarian results. In this paper, the bivariate
G.A.R.C.H. model is used for the computation of cross-terms and financial spillover
among the U.S. and emerging stock markets. This model has the potential to incorp-
orate a quadratic form in such a manner that it produces a positive semi-definite
covariance matrix, which guarantees non-negative estimated variance. Further details
are discussed by Fang, Lin and Lee (2007), Kearney and Patton (2000), Kim et al.
(2015) and Malik and Hammoudeh (2007).
The standard B.E.K.K. parameterisation proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) for
a bivariate G.A.R.C.H. (1,1) model is written as
Ht ¼ C0Cþ A0et1e0t1Aþ B0Ht1B
where the individual C, A and B matrices are written as
A ¼ a11 a12
a21 a22
 
;B ¼ b11 b12
b21 b22
 
;C ¼ c11 0
c21 c22
 
A is a 2 2 square matrix of parameters that shows how the conditional variances
are correlated with the past squared errors whose elements capture the effect of
shocks on conditional variance (volatility). B is also a square matrix of parameters
that shows how past conditional variance affects the present conditional variance. C
is a 2 2 parametric lower triangular matrix.
h11;tþ1 ¼ a211e21;t þ 2a11a12e1;te2;t þ 2a11e1;te3;t þ a221e22;t þ 2a21e2;t þ b211h11;t
þ2b11b12h12;t þ 2b11h13;t þ b221h22;t þ 2b21
h22;tþ1 ¼ a212e21;t þ 2a12a22e1;te2;t þ 2a12e1;t þ a222e22;t þ 2a22e2;t þ b212h11;t
þ2b12b22h12;t þ 2b12 þ b222h22;t þ 2b22
In these equations the parameters a12; a21; b12; b21 estimate how shocks and volatility
are transmitted across markets over a period of time, while the parameters
a11; a22; b11; b22 present past shocks and past volatility effects (A.R.C.H. and
G.A.R.C.H. effects). We maximised the Likelihood function assuming that errors are
normally distributed, and it is expressed as:
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L hð Þ ¼ T ln 2pð Þ1=2
XT
t¼1
ln jHtj þ e0tH1t et
 
where h is the estimated parameter and T is the number of observations.
4. Data source and sampling
To achieve the objectives of the study, the daily data of stock indexes for the U.S.
(N.Y.S.E.) (Ihttps://www.nyse.com/index), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange,
K.L.S.E.) (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/), Korea (Korea Composite Stock
Price Index, K.O.S.P.I.) (http://global.krx.co.kr/main/main.jsp), Russia (Russian
Trading System, R.T.S.) (https://www.moex.com/en/), India (B.S.E.) (https://www.
bseindia.com/), China (Shanghai Stock Exchange, S.S.E.) (http://english.sse.com.cn/)
and Pakistan (Karachi Stock Exchange, K.S.E.) (https://www.psx.com.pk/) have been
taken from the official websites. The data has been taken for the time period 1 July
2005 to 30 June 2015. The time period has been divided into three parts: pre-financial
crisis, during the financial crisis and post-financial crisis periods. The trading days in
Figure 1. Conditions of stock markets before, during and after the global financial crisis.
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all stock markets are not the same due to varying public holidays across different econo-
mies. To deal with the non-synchronised trading days problem, the returns on these
days are considered to be zero, because a zero return on these days reflects the actual
returns on non-trading days (Yarovaya, Bezeszcynski & Lau, 2016). The pre-crisis period
consists of 1 July 2005 to 30 July 2007. In August 2007, the crisis began when Lehman
Brothers closed its subprime lender (BNC Mortgage). It induced this New York invest-
ment bank to cut 1200 positions in 23 different locations. This ultimately effected a $27
million goodwill reduction, and it took a $25 million after-tax charge. Finally, in
September 2008, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, which quickly resulted in a
sharp decline in stock market indices across the globe. Therefore, the financial crisis
period starts 1 August 2007 and ends 29 May 2009, because after this time the stock
markets became stable (Dungey and Gajurel 2014). The post-financial crisis time-period
is from June 2009 to 30 June 2015. Figure 1 presents the division of time periods and
the conditions of selected stock markets before, during and after the global financial cri-
sis. In the pre-crisis period, each stock market shows a smooth movement, while during
the crisis period the movements of each stock index are volatile and show a declining
trend. After the crisis period, however, the stock markets revert to smooth movements.
For data analysis E-VIEWS (IHS Global Inc. CA, USA) and RATSPro software
(Estima1560 Sherman Ave, IL, USA) were used.
5. Empirical results and discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics
The results for the descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 1. The results reveal
that during the pre-crisis period the S.S.E. shows the highest mean return followed by
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for stock index return series.
N.Y.S.E. B.S.E. K.L.S.E. K.O.S.P.I. K.S.E. R.T.S. S.S.E.
Pre-crisis period (1 July 2005 to 31 July 2007), n¼ 510
Mean 0.000699 0.001630 0.000876 0.001323 0.001303 0.002105 0.002650
Minimum 0.035323 0.067637 0.046356 0.034503 0.058629 0.093717 0.088407
SD 0.006996 0.014395 0.006653 0.010924 0.014507 0.017285 0.015875
Skewness 0.245812 0.415260 1.031470 0.374925 0.582713 0.842432 1.062275
Kurtosis 5.144921 5.864714 10.53965 3.715292 4.800143 7.484516 7.665001
Jarque-Bera 102.9006 189.0474 1298.419 22.82077 97.72304 487.68 558.3639
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000011 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Crisis period (1 August 2007 to 29 May 2009), n¼ 447
Mean 0.001186 0.000119 0.000593 0.000451 0.001256 0.001433 0.000593
Minimum 0.097260 0.109564 0.094968 0.105705 0.051415 0.191031 0.077287
SD 0.023928 0.026865 0.012490 0.022480 0.018149 0.035258 0.025341
Skewness 0.086735 0.508054 0.898172 0.192567 0.031096 0.322006 0.108421
Kurtosis 6.963702 7.114642 10.61328 6.864915 4.793582 11.17033 4.115026
Jarque-Bera 293.1766 334.5563 1139.642 280.9748 59.9875 1251.023 24.03191
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000006
Post-crisis period (1 June 2009 to 30 June 2015), n¼ 1505
Mean 0.000557 0.000514 0.000395 0.000306 0.001069 0.000363 0.000546
Minimum 0.070507 0.058315 0.144169 0.062185 0.044556 0.124137 0.077047
SD 0.010985 0.011045 0.009400 0.010523 0.009640 0.019795 0.013592
Skewness 0.298000 0.059373 2.268928 0.348482 0.258959 0.090697 0.360550
Kurtosis 6.501483 4.223632 163.0212 6.489575 5.277945 7.95888 12.94478
Jarque-Bera 791.1029 94.77592 1607051 794.069 342.2165 1544.092 6234.373
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Source: Author calculation.
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the R.T.S. and the B.S.E. Interestingly, these markets also have the lowest mean return
values and highest standard deviations, which indicates that these stock markets are
more volatile than other emerging markets during the pre-crisis period. During the
crisis period, the mean returns of all stock markets are negative except for the B.S.E.,
while the S.S.E., K.L.S.E. and K.O.S.P.I. show the lowest mean returns. It has also
been observed that the standard deviations of all stocks during this period doubled or
increased even more as compared to the pre-crisis period. In the post-crisis period,
however, the mean returns normalised and standard deviation figures reverted to the
level of the pre-crisis period. The results also indicate that the return series for all
markets during all the time periods are negatively skewed. Moreover, the excess val-
ues of kurtosis signify that the series are leptokurtic. The results of the Jarque–Bera
normality test are significant at 1%, which means that the return series are not nor-
mally distributed. The Jarque–Bera normality test further supported the results for
skewness and kurtosis.
5.2. Augmented Dickey–Fuller test
The stock indexes of the selected emerging markets are not based on similar values.
Therefore, the logs of all stocks series are taken before running the A.D.F. unit root
test. The results of the A.D.F. unit root test at level and at first difference are pre-
sented in Table 2. The null hypothesis of the unit root has been rejected at a 1% sig-
nificance level for all of the series. The results indicate that the log price series
(N.Y.S.E., B.S.E., K.O.S.P.I., K.S.E., K.L.S.E., R.T.S. and S.S.E.) are non-stationary at
level and stationary at first difference for all of the samples.
5.3. Johansen and Juselius cointegration
The results of the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test are presented in Table 3.
The first column contains the name of the specific tests (Trace and Max-eigenvalue). The
second column in the table demonstrates H0, with r¼ 0, r 1, r 2, r 3, r 4, r 5
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test.
Series index
Pre-crisis During crisis Post-crisis
Log 1st diff Log 1st diff Log 1st diff
N.Y.S.E. 0.3477 22.677 0.3716 18.335 2.0306 41.109
[0.9149] [0.000] [0.9110] [0.000] [0.2737] [0.000]
B.S.E. 1.2427 21.361 1.1062 19.303 1.0619 36.647
[0.6572] [0.000] [0.7147] [0.000] [0.7326] [0.000]
K.O.S.P.I. 0.2439 21.684 1.4314 20.815 3.2617 38.130
[0.9300] [0.000] [0.5675] [0.000] [0.0169] [0.000]
K.S.E. 1.2593 21.219 0.5940 15.914 0.5070 36.158
[0.6497] [0.000] [0.8689] [0.000] [0.8874] [0.000]
K.L.S.E. 0.7231 18.107 0.6034 16.427 3.1471 51.268
[0.9926] [0.000] [0.8663] [0.000] [0.0235] [0.000]
R.T.S. 2.2747 21.013 0.4656 18.680 2.4822 35.262
[0.1807] [0.000] [0.8947] [0.000] [0.1200] [0.000]
S.S.E. 0.8202 23.009 0.5894 21.065 0.6526 39.202
[0.9943] [0.000] [0.8699] [0.000] [0.9911] [0.000]
Notes: 1% critical value is 3.452442 for the A.D.F. unit root test. All results are significant at 1% critical level. 1st
diff = First Difference. Source: Author calculation.
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and r 6, which indicate at most none, at most 1, at most 2, at most 3, most 4, most 5
and at most 6 cointegration relationships, respectively. The third, fourth and fifth col-
umns present the Trace and Max-eigenvalue statistics for pre-crisis, during crisis and
post-crisis time periods, respectively. In the pre-crisis time period, the Trace statistics
test indicates two cointegrating equations at 5% critical level, and the Max-eigenvalue
test indicates one cointegrating equation at the 5% critical level. These statistics reveal
that two null hypotheses are rejected. It means that there are two cointegrating equa-
tions r¼ 2 among the six stock markets at a 5% significance level. Therefore, this sup-
ports our assumption that there exists a long-run relationship between the N.Y.S.E. and
the B.S.E., K.O.S.P.I., K.S.E., K.L.S.E., R.T.S. and S.S.E. during the pre-crisis time period.
In the crisis period there are two cointegration equations of both the Trace statistic
and Max-eigenvalue, which present similar levels of cointegrations as before the crisis
period. In the post-crisis time period, however, the number of long-term cointegrat-
ing equations has increased. The Trace statistic test indicates four cointegrating equa-
tions at 5% critical level, and the Max-eigenvalue test indicates three cointegrating
equations at 5% critical level. This means that after the crisis period the stock markets
are highly cointegrated with the N.Y.S.E. as compared to the pre-crisis and crisis peri-
ods. In all of the sample periods, we find long-run cointegrations among the emerg-
ing stock markets and the N.Y.S.E. Therefore we now move to the V.E.C.M. model.
5.4. Vector error correction model and impulse response
The results for the V.E.C.M. revealed that during the pre-crisis and crisis time periods,
there are long-run causalities among the N.Y.S.E. and the selected emerging stock mar-
kets, while the post-crisis time period shows short-run interconnections. The results of
this study are in agreement with the claim of importance for the third variable in a
bivariate V.A.R. as described by Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2005). The results do not
show a causal relationship between Pakistan’s stock returns and the U.S. stock returns
in the short run, but the cointegration vector for the bivariate system is statistically sig-
nificant. The results based on both the Trace test and the Max-eigenvalue test support
long-run relationships between the variables, which is an indication of cointegration
Table 3. Results of the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test.
Series statistic Null hypothesis Pre-crisis During crisis Post-crisis
Trace r¼ 0 177.1918 170.9671 222.1651
r 1 99.79204 109.4624 144.4044
r 2 61.1511 68.2740 85.10598
r 3 35.7332 39.1414 48.18978
r 4 17.8453 20.0771 23.4301
r 5 6.4366 9.2951 7.5885
r 6 0.0099 2.0365 0.6459
Max-eigenvalue r¼ 0 77.39978 61.50477 77.76067
r 1 38.6410 41.18833 59.29845
r 2 25.4179 29.1326 36.9162
r 3 17.8879 19.0643 24.7597
r 4 11.4088 10.7820 15.8416
r 5 6.4267 7.2586 6.9427
r 6 0.0099 2.0365 0.6459
Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. Source: Author calculation.
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among the variables. The results of Deng and Yang (2008); and Qi and Boping (2009)
also support our results for long-term cointegration.
During the crisis period the results of the Trace test and the Max-eigenvalue test
show that there are cointegrating vectors for each economy, and during and after the
crisis period we find at most one cointegrating equation as a result of the Johansen
and Juselius (1990) cointegration test. The results in Table 3 show that ECMt-1
(Error Correction Model in the root line) is significant, indicating a long-run equilib-
rium relationship between all economies. During the crisis period, the results for
ECMt-1 for emerging market economies are found to be significant, which shows
equilibrium in long-run relationships for all economies. In the case of the Malaysian
stock market, if there is an error in equilibrium in the short run then 3.5% of the
error is corrected by global stock returns (N.Y.S.E.), 7.8% of the error is corrected by
Indian stock returns and 6.3% by Korean stock returns. The results also show that
there is inertia in Indian, Korean and Malaysian stock returns. Moreover, it is found
that, in the short run, global stock returns (N.Y.S.E.) does affect the B.S.E. and K.S.E.
at first lag and K.L.S.E. (both at first and second lags) before the crisis period and
during the financial crisis then global stock returns (N.Y.S.E.) only affect the
K.O.S.P.I. at first but on the second lag it affects B.S.E. and R.T.S. returns, whereas
1.9% of the error can be corrected by the K.O.S.P.I. returns during the financial crisis
period. The results for the Chinese economy represent that 4% of the error is rectified
by the ECMt-1 compared to 9% before the crisis, whereas in the short run the global
stock exchange does affect the domestic stock returns of all the stock exchanges after
the crisis period except the K.O.S.P.I. as compared to during the crisis period, where
it has a significant impact only on the K.O.S.P.I. The global stock returns do affect
the B.S.E. and R.T.S. on the second lag in the short term during the crisis period.
(For details see Appendix A).
From Figures 1–3 in Appendix B, we can see that the responses of all south Asian
emerging economies towards the shock of the N.Y.S.E. are negative, except for
K.L.S.E. and R.T.S., which is due to less cross-portfolio investment between the U.S.
stock returns and Russian stock returns. Moreover, it is only the R.T.S. stock returns
that become stable at lag-5 after the shock from the N.Y.S.E.; the rest of the stock
returns do take more time to revert to mean values. From the impulse response
graph, we can easily infer that a positive shock in the returns for the N.Y.S.E. bring a
change in the returns of other South Asian Emerging economies. In addition, the
S.S.E., K.L.S.E. and K.O.S.P.I. were the stocks that did not show negative returns in
response to the shock. During the financial crisis period, one standard deviation
shock in the N.Y.S.E. brings a negative response in all economies except on the
Indian stock market. At the third lag all economies respond positively to the shock,
but Indian returns declined. Moreover, the responses of these emerging economies
normalised at lag-10. So, we can say that a standard deviation shock in the N.Y.S.E.
can bring volatility in the returns of the emerging markets up to lag-10. The emerg-
ing markets have adopted precautionary measures to stabilise and avoid the impact of
the financial crisis, but from the graphs we can see that these economies are affected
in either way. The results for impulse response after the financial crisis are similar to
the results for before the financial crisis period, and we can see that all economies
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respond positively to a standard deviation shock of the N.Y.S.E. In the period after
the financial crisis we see that all of the economies are on the negative side except
for the R.T.S. and K.O.S.P.I. This is quite similar to the results for before the financial
crisis period, when all economies were on the positive side except for the R.T.S.
and K.O.S.P.I.
5.5 G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K.
Table 4 presents the estimated results for the bivariate G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model
during the pre-crisis time period. In the bivariate G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. (1,1) model
the important coefficients are A(1,1), A(2,2), B(1,1) and B(2,2). The diagonal elements in
matrices A(1,1) and A(2,2) present A.R.C.H. effects (their own past shock effects), while
the diagonal elements in matrices B(1,1) and B(2,2) capture G.A.R.C.H. effects (their
own past volatility effects). It can be observed in Table 4 that most of the estimated
diagonal parameters are highly significant, representing the existence of strong
A.R.C.H. and G.A.R.C.H. effects in the entire selected scenario. This means that in
the pre-crisis time period the conditional variances of all series are affected by their
own past shocks and past volatility.
Table 4. G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. results for the pre-crisis period.
B.S.E. K.S.E. K.L.S.E. K.O.S.P.I. R.T.S. S.S.E.
C(1,1) 41.988 48.058 60.405 45.427 45.286 41.781
[9.366] [12.292] [12.942] [7.948] [7.714] [10.632]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C(2,1) 62.147 14.340 1.724 2.473 6.306 2.174
[7.332] [0.982] [3.239] [1.485] [1.185] [1.925]
(0.000) (0.326) (0.001) (0.137) (0.236) (0.054)
C(2,2) 21.893 127.86 3.452 12.294 28.875 0.000
[0.790] [12.645] [11.157] [15.740] [13.080] [0.000]
(0.430) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000)
A(1,1) 0.169 0.948 0.958 0.957 0.958 0.036
[1.933] [26.365] [28.197] [25.210] [26.388] [0.524]
(0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.600)
A(1,2) 0.260 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.098
[1.109] [0.305] [0.120] [0.193] [0.657] [5.250]
(0.267) (0.761) (0.904) (0.847) (0.511) (0.000)
A(2,1) 0.060 0.010 0.200 0.119 0.022 0.426
[3.071] [2.165] [2.458] [1.527] [0.684] [4.769]
(0.002) (0.030) (0.014) (0.127) (0.494) (0.000)
A(2,2) 0.619 0.962 1.007 0.982 0.977 0.516
[11.724] [26.405] [30.313] [26.807] [28.768] [12.344]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,1) 0.539 0.308 0.135 0.246 0.313 0.632
[5.050] [4.890] [3.177] [3.569] [4.519] [7.989]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,2) 0.983 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.043 0.064
[3.486] [0.174] [0.813] [0.550] [3.165] [4.122]
(0.000) (0.862) (0.416) (0.582) (0.002) (0.000)
B(2,1) 0.117 0.003 0.183 0.389 0.134 0.232
[5.680] [0.402] [1.630] [3.424] [2.188] [5.894]
(0.000) (0.688) (0.103) (0.001) (0.029) (0.000)
B(2,2) 0.581 0.322 0.046 0.194 0.154 0.843
[9.018] [5.656] [1.272] [2.883] [2.065] [49.634]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.203) (0.004) (0.039) (0.000)
Log-lh 6050 7293 5660 6021 6476 5212
Note: subscripts 1 and 2 denote the N.Y.S.E. and each of the selected stock markets. t-statistic are in brackets and p-
value are in parentheses. ,  indicate 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Log-lh = Log-likelihood. Source:
Author calculation.
202 S. GULZAR ET AL.
The shock spillover and volatility spillover between two markets could be observed
from the off-diagonal elements of matrices A and B. The off-diagonal elements in
matrices A(1,2) and A(2,1) represent cross-market news effects, while the off-diagonal
elements in matrices B(1,2) and B(2,1) capture volatility spillover effects. For the B.S.E.,
K.S.E., K.L.S.E. and S.S.E. stock markets the off-diagonal diagnostic coefficients A(1,2)
and A(2,1) are significant, representing shock spillover directions between two stock
markets. The off-diagonal diagnostics for the S.S.E. indicate the bi-directional spill-
over effect. The shocks in the N.Y.S.E. affect the present volatility of the S.S.E., and
vice versa. The tendency for S.S.E. shocks to the N.Y.S.E., however, is 0.09% greater
compared with N.Y.S.E. to the S.S.E. In the cases of the B.S.E., K.S.E. and K.L.S.E.,
there are one-sided reverse shock effects. This means that before the crisis period
these markets had no cross-market news effects from the N.Y.S.E. The other two
stock markets (K.O.S.P.I. and R.T.S.) are not, however, affected by cross-market news
effects during this time period. Moreover, the results for the off-diagonal elements in
matrices B(1,2) and B(2,1) are significant, indicating volatility spillover between two
stock markets. The B.S.E., R.T.S. and S.S.E. have bi-directional volatility spillover
effects, meaning that the markets are affecting each other. The tendency for N.Y.S.E.
shocks is, however, greater for the B.S.E. and R.T.S. compared to vice versa. The
K.S.E. and K.L.S.E. have no volatility spillover effects, and K.O.S.P.I. has one-sided
volatility spillover effects. Furthermore, the results show both negative and positive
volatility spillover from the N.Y.S.E. to emerging markets during the pre-crisis
time period.
The estimated results for the bivariate G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. (1,1) model during the
period of the crisis are presented in Table 5. During the period of the crisis there is a
strong A.R.C.H. effect in all of the stock markets. As the diagonal elements in matri-
ces A(1,1) and A(2,2) are significant at the 1% critical value. This means that stock
markets are affected by their own past shock effects. The results also reveal that most
of the estimated diagonal parameters B(1,1) and B(2,2) are highly significant, represent-
ing the existence of strong G.A.R.C.H. effects in all stock markets except for the
B.S.E. It means that during the period of crisis the conditional variances for all series
are affected by their own past shocks and past volatility.
During the crisis time period, the shock spillover and volatility spillover between
the N.Y.S.E. and other stock markets present a different picture than that of the pre-
crisis time period. Only the K.O.S.P.I. and R.T.S. off-diagonal coefficients A(1,2) and
A(2,1) are significant during this period. There are bi-directional spillover effects in
the case of the K.O.S.P.I., and the R.T.S. is affected by one-sided shock spillover. The
results present normal pictures of spillover effects, which are the negative cross-mar-
ket news effects from the N.Y.S.E. to K.O.S.P.I., and the positive cross-market news
effects from K.O.S.P.I. to the N.Y.S.E. The results here for the K.O.S.P.I. are similar
to our findings from the V.E.C.M. Other stock markets, however, have no cross-mar-
ket news effects during the crisis time period. Moreover, the results for off-diagonal
elements B(1,2) and B(2,1) indicate volatility spillover between the N.Y.S.E. and other
stock markets: except for the K.S.E., all stock markets have volatility spillover effects.
The results, however, present negative volatility spillover from the N.Y.S.E. to the
B.S.E. and reverse negative volatility spillover from the K.L.S.E., K.O.S.P.I., R.T.S. and
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S.S.E. to the N.Y.S.E. The results reveal that the B.S.E. is the only stock market that
has a volatility spillover effect (0.0151) from the N.Y.S.E. during the crisis period.
The strong A.R.C.H. and G.A.R.C.H. effects during the post-crisis time period can
be observed from Table 6. The high significance values of the diagonal elements in
matrices A(1,1), A(2,2), B(1,1) and B(2,2) present strong own past shock and own past
volatility effects in the emerging markets. In Table 6, the off-diagonal elements of
matrices A and B present significant results for shock spillover and volatility spillover
as compared with the pre-crisis and crisis time periods. The results reveal that there
are bi-directional cross-market news effects in the cases of the B.S.E., R.T.S. and
K.L.S.E., whereas the K.S.E., K.O.S.P.I. and S.S.E. have one-sided cross-market news
effects. Moreover, the results show that cross-market news from the N.Y.S.E. has a
positive spillover effect on the B.S.E. and R.T.S., and a negative effect on the K.L.S.E.
and S.S.E. The estimated results of volatility spillover are also significant, showing
that the B.S.E. and R.T.S. have negative volatility spillover effects from the N.Y.S.E.,
and K.L.S.E. has a positive effect. The S.S.E. did not, however, have volatility spillover
effects. Moreover, the B.S.E., K.S.E., K.O.S.P.I. and R.T.S. have one-sided volatility
spillover, whereas the K.L.S.E. has bi-directional volatility spillover.
Table 5. G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. results for the crisis period.
B.S.E. K.S.E. K.L.S.E. K.O.S.P.I. R.T.S. S.S.E.
C(1,1) 116.82 50.099 43.845 25.264 41.805 43.780
[12.370] [6.523] [4.393] [3.224] [5.029] [6.472]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
C(2,1) 25.050 14.086 2.062 14.883 7.285 10.717
[0.544] [1.258] [1.705] [12.714] [3.117] [1.849]
(0.587) (0.208) (0.088) (0.000) (0.002) (0.064)
C(2,2) 337.72 53.219 5.156 0.000 9.874 26.565
[11.706] [4.708] [6.482] [0.000] [5.035] [4.853]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000)
A(1,1) 0.992 0.354 0.353 0.171 0.278 0.352
[28.220] [8.995] [7.639] [4.478] [6.489] [9.327]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
A(1,2) 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.042 0.015 0.021
[0.157] [0.063] [0.701] [3.206] [1.117] [0.821]
(0.875) (0.950) (0.483) (0.001) (0.264) (0.412)
A(2,1) 0.002 0.036 0.267 0.607 0.624 0.131
[0.494] [1.190] [0.496] [2.340] [3.634] [1.854]
(0.622) (0.234) (0.620) (0.019) (0.000) (0.064)
A(2,2) 0.991 0.542 0.440 0.418 0.516 0.446
[27.695] [11.411] [7.855] [10.675] [11.307] [9.261]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,1) 0.007 0.875 0.886 0.938 0.906 0.885
[0.071] [35.381] [28.993] [64.558] [39.113] [46.567]
(0.943) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,2) 0.151 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.006 0.006
[2.725] [0.048] [0.284] [1.886] [0.777] [0.489]
(0.006) (0.962) (0.777) (0.059) (0.437) (0.625)
B(2,1) 0.009 0.036 0.805 0.979 0.348 0.096
[0.874] [1.902] [2.482] [18.257] [3.958] [2.651]
(0.382) (0.057) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
B(2,2) 0.086 0.806 0.813 0.749 0.815 0.839
[0.894] [25.004] [22.445] [26.540] [31.760] [27.880]
(0.371) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-lh 7140 5798 4672 5015 5103 5492
Note: subscripts 1 and 2 denote the N.Y.S.E. and each of the selected stock markets. t-statistic are in brackets and p-
value are in parentheses. ,  indicate 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Source: Author calculation.
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In this paper, we applied different techniques: the Johansen and Juselius cointegra-
tion test, V.E.C.M., impulse response and the G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model. All
approaches provide similar results. The Johansen and Juselius cointegration test
shows long-run cointegration of emerging stock markets with the U.S. stock market,
which supports previous studies (Bae and Zhang, 2015; Huyghebaert and Wang,
2010; Masih and Masih, 1999). We find, however, that the cointegration level does
not remain the same in different circumstances, which supports the findings of
Graham et al. (2012). Moreover, we find that the number of cointegration equations
increased after the crisis time period, which is similar to the findings of Yang et al.
(2003) and Dooley and Hutchison (2009) for emerging stock markets. The V.E.C.M.
and the impulse response function reveal that the emerging markets stock returns
have a short-term shock effect from the U.S. financial market (N.Y.S.E.), supporting
the study by Kayani, Xiaofeng and Gulzar (2013). We also find that the stock markets
have their own past shock effects and own past volatility effects (A.R.C.H. and
G.A.R.C.H. effects) during all time periods.
From the results for the G.A.R.C.H. B.E.K.K. model, the K.O.S.P.I. is the only
stock market that has cross-market news effects from the N.Y.S.E. during the crisis
Table 6. G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. results for the post-crisis period.
B.S.E. K.S.E. K.L.S.E. K.O.S.P.I. R.T.S. S.S.E.
C(1,1) 24.071 19.747 27.104 20.500 20.298 28.326
[9.306] [7.679] [6.791] [6.089] [6.746] [9.802]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C(2,1) 33.535 5.922 2.574 4.135 4.099 0.852
[3.288] [0.716] [3.441] [4.761] [2.483] [0.767]
(0.001) (0.474) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.443)
C(2,2) 57.212 47.032 4.680 3.140 8.248 4.987
[7.029] [12.797] [13.550] [3.940] [5.593] [5.175]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
A(1,1) 0.349 0.273 0.018 0.247 0.342 0.370
[13.457] [12.036] [0.474] [9.472] [11.230] [13.762]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.636) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
A(1,2) 0.192 0.005 0.066 0.003 0.044 0.024
[2.276] [0.095] [14.574] [0.548] [3.307] [2.432]
(0.023) (0.925) (0.000) (0.584) (0.001) (0.015)
A(2,1) 0.032 0.035 0.216 0.696 0.491 0.098
[2.343] [4.537] [2.313] [6.113] [5.056] [1.776]
(0.019) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076)
A(2,2) 0.201 0.562 0.281 0.341 0.234 0.343
[6.621] [48.292] [8.796] [18.586] [7.490] [17.469]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,1) 0.889 0.930 0.914 0.910 0.901 0.867
[55.040] [86.533] [45.829] [68.396] [67.871] [47.230]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B(1,2) 0.106 0.033 0.009 0.002 0.022 0.009
[2.188] [1.079] [2.649] [0.656] [3.038] [1.479]
(0.029) (0.280) (0.008) (0.512) (0.002) (0.139)
B(2,1) 0.007 0.021 1.752 0.572 0.109 0.044
[1.118] [5.487] [14.890] [8.019] [1.689] [1.439]
(0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.150)
B(2,2) 0.922 0.807 0.673 0.899 0.887 0.934
[69.200] [108.107] [24.515] [77.179] [30.738] [113.173]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log-lh 18946 18485 14439 15227 15703 16199
Note: subscripts 1 and 2 denote the N.Y.S.E. and each of the selected stock markets. t-statistics are in square brackets
and p-values are in parentheses. ,  indicate 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Source: Author calculation.
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period, and there are volatility spillover effects from the N.Y.S.E. to the B.S.E. The
K.S.E. is the only stock market that has no cross-market news and volatility spill-
over effects during the crisis time period. The reason is that capital inflow in
Pakistan is mostly dependent upon the International Monetary fund (I.M.F.) for
loans and aid, Eurobonds, financial grants, etc., due to the limited operation of
international banks in the domestic market, and a lack of foreign portfolio and
greenfield investments. These economic conditions have isolated it from the rest of
the world. These results are partially contradicted by Kayani, Xiaofeng and Gulzar
(2014) and Balli et al. (2015), as they found a strong spillover effect from the global
financial crisis on Pakistan. The findings of Dungey and Gajurel (2014) support
this study, showing that the emerging stock markets have not been much affected
by the global financial crisis. From the results for the G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model
we find that there are only two stock markets, the K.O.S.P.I. and the B.S.E., that
are affected by shock spillover and volatility spillover from the N.Y.S.E. during the
crisis period.
The results reveal that the B.S.E. has a direct negative volatility spillover effect
during entire time periods (pre-, during and post-crisis); the magnitude of the
spillover effect has, however, seen a declining trend, which also shows the process
of lower interdependence between the Indian stock market and the U.S. stock mar-
ket. In a post-crisis period it also has a positive cross-market news effect from the
U.S. market. These results are consistent with the findings of Aloui et al. (2011),
who found that India had contagion effects from the U.S. stock market during the
crisis, contradicting Gupta and Guidi (2012), who found that the Indian stock mar-
ket had weak interdependence with other developed Asian markets and the U.S.
stock market. We also find that the K.L.S.E. is not affected by the shock and vola-
tility spillovers during the pre-crisis and crisis time periods. The situation of the
K.L.S.E. has, however, changed in the post-crisis period: it has negative cross-mar-
ket news and positive volatility spillover effects from the N.Y.S.E. This means that
after the crisis period its connection with the U.S. financial market has increased.
Furthermore, the R.T.S. also has no direct spillover effect during the crisis so it
only shows reverse shock spillover and reverse volatility spillover effects. Then,
after the crisis period, it has positive cross-market news and negative volatility
spillover effects from the N.Y.S.E. Additionally, there are positive shock spillover
and volatility spillover effects in the pre-crisis time period and negative cross-mar-
ket news effects after the crisis period from the N.Y.S.E. to the S.S.E. During the
crisis, due to strong government intervention and control on the S.S.E., the market
was safe from both shocks.
Overall, we find significant cross-market news and volatility spillover effects from
the N.Y.S.E. to emerging Asian economies during different time periods. The results
of this study are supported by several previous studies; Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo and Martin (2010) also found the symptom of contagion to Russia. These
results are also supported by Balli et al. (2015), although they have ignored Russia
and China but found evidence of spillover on Malaysia and India. The result for the
B.S.E., R.T.S. and S.S.E. are also supported by Dungey and Gajurel (2014), though
their work was only limited to the B.R.I.C. economies.
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6. Conclusions
This study investigates the financial cointegration and spillover effects of the global
financial crisis upon the stock markets of Asian emerging economies. The results of
our analysis depict that there is a significant spillover effect from the U.S. stock mar-
ket (N.Y.S.E.) upon the stock markets of emerging economies (S.S.E., B.S.E., K.L.S.E.,
R.T.S., K.O.S.P.I. and K.S.E.) Using multivariate analysis, we have seen that all of our
techniques like Johansen and Juselius, V.E.C.M., impulse response and bivariate
G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. presented the same results and have shown the presence of spill-
over effects from the N.Y.S.E. on the emerging economies in all three cases, i.e.,
before, during and after the financial crisis.
The Johansen and Juselius cointegration test showed significant long-run cointe-
gration of emerging stock markets with the N.Y.S.E. in pre-, during and post-crisis
time periods. Moreover, we find that the number of cointegration equations increased
after the crisis time period. Due to the presence of cointegration, we have adopted
the V.E.C.M. methodology. We have seen a short-term correlation between the
N.Y.S.E. and most of the emerging economies examined. Moreover, to check the
responses of these emerging economies, we have used the impulse response function
in all three scenarios. The results have found significant evidence for the presence of
spillover effects. The study concludes that the returns of the emerging stock markets
are affected by volatility in the U.S. stock market.
From the results for the G.A.R.C.H.-B.E.K.K. model we found significant A.R.C.H.
and G.A.R.C.H. effects in all of the selected stock markets during all specified time
periods. The shock spillover and volatility spillover effects are also significant for dif-
ferent stocks markets in different time periods. In the pre-crisis time period, the
S.S.E. has cross-market news effects, and the B.S.E., R.T.S. and S.S.E. have volatility
spillover effects. Moreover, during the crisis the K.O.S.P.I. has a negative cross-market
news effect, and a negative volatility spillover effect originates from the N.Y.S.E. to
the B.S.E. Furthermore, we find that, in the post-crisis period, emerging stock mar-
kets are more affected by shocks originating from the N.Y.S.E. There are significant
positive cross-market news effects from the N.Y.S.E. to the B.S.E. and R.T.S., and
negative effects on the K.L.S.E. and S.S.E., while the volatility spillover effects are
negative on the B.S.E. and R.T.S., and positive on the K.L.S.E. During the whole sam-
pling period, we find that the K.S.E. is the only stock market that is not affected by
any shock. Overall, in all of the selected time periods (pre-crisis, during the crisis and
post-crisis) there are significant shock spillover and volatility spillover effects of the
global financial crisis from the N.Y.S.E. to different emerging Asians stock markets
(S.S.E., B.S.E., K.L.S.E., R.T.S., K.O.S.P.I. and K.S.E.)
The findings of this study have indispensable implications for both risk managers
and portfolio investors. An understanding of the cointegration level of major stock
markets with the U.S. can help portfolio managers to reduce risk and increase diversi-
fication benefits. Extra importance (weight) can be given to those economies that are
less cointegrated with the developed stock markets. The stock markets that have no
spillover effects could be a better option for portfolio investments, and this will help
to reduce risk. Despite wholehearted efforts there exist some limitations in the study
that need to be considered in future research. This study has only focused on the
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evaluation of the impact of the global financial crisis on the cointegration and volatil-
ity spillover effects between six emerging Asian economies and the U.S., whereas a
comprehensive study can be carried out in the future to identify the transmission
channels of how the crisis spread to these economies, and what role did the funda-
mentals of each economy play in preventing or transmitting the crisis. Moreover, this
paper also provides a clue for further research in the area of cointegration and conta-
gion. As the selected stock markets belong to the same region and are situated very
close to each other, cross-market spillover effects of these economies can also be
studied in the future. It will definitely provide a better and clearer picture for port-
folio managers.
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Appendix A
Vector error correction method results
Table A1. Pre-crisis vector error correction model (V.E.C.M.)
Error correction D(NYSE) D(BSE) D(KOSPI) D(KSE) D(KLSE) D(RTS) D(SSE)
CointEq1 0.258484 0.662785 0.367540 0.118881 0.270169 0.182460 0.083608
(0.04066) (0.07812) (0.06324) (0.08475) (0.03536) (0.10236) (0.09946)
[6.35703] [8.48407] [5.81171] [1.40266] [7.64130] [1.78251] [0.84060]
D(NYSE(1)) 0.494319 0.441747 0.095294 0.290957 0.227173 0.101079 0.117490
(0.04704) (0.09037) (0.07316) (0.09804) (0.04090) (0.11841) (0.11506)
[10.5090] [4.88808] [1.30256] [2.96759] [5.55420] [0.85361] [1.02112]
D(NYSE(2)) 0.321293 0.114909 0.012356 0.118391 0.080385 0.046903 0.065043
(0.04205) (0.08079) (0.06540) (0.08764) (0.03656) (0.10585) (0.10286)
[7.64105] [1.42239] [0.18893] [1.35080] [2.19856] [0.44310] [0.63237]
D(BSE(1)) 0.189857 0.183278 0.188310 0.100737 0.133711 0.064729 0.037046
(0.03050) (0.05860) (0.04743) (0.06357) (0.02652) (0.07678) (0.07460)
[6.22517] [3.12786] [3.96989] [1.58466] [5.04200] [0.84308] [0.49658]
D(BSE(2)) 0.124483 0.137916 0.056598 0.108837 0.050023 0.061518 0.028500
(0.02375) (0.04563) (0.03694) (0.04951) (0.02065) (0.05979) (0.05810)
[5.24105] [3.02226] [1.53210] [2.19839] [2.42208] [1.02885] [0.49055]
D(KOSPI(1)) 0.089683 0.430754 0.465284 0.071918 0.133862 0.122383 0.024211
(0.03244) (0.06232) (0.05045) (0.06761) (0.02820) (0.08166) (0.07934)
[2.76492] [6.91216] [9.22295] [1.06373] [4.74616] [1.49878] [0.30514]
D(KOSPI(2)) 0.017560 0.253844 0.245868 0.020533 0.042831 0.063985 0.136236
(0.02767) (0.05317) (0.04304) (0.05768) (0.02406) (0.06967) (0.06769)
[0.63451] [4.77425] [5.71226] [0.35596] [1.77991] [0.91844] [2.01250]
D(KSE(1)) 0.035094 0.016840 0.026924 0.597301 0.009794 0.083723 0.008959
(0.02079) (0.03994) (0.03234) (0.04333) (0.01808) (0.05234) (0.05085)
[1.68803] [0.42159] [0.83267] [13.7836] [0.54178] [1.59970] [0.17617]
D(KSE(2)) 0.019068 0.012636 0.049580 0.302515 0.023850 0.077562 0.047306
(0.02007) (0.03856) (0.03121) (0.04183) (0.01745) (0.05052) (0.04909)
[0.95010] [0.32771] [1.58835] [7.23153] [1.36669] [1.53517] [0.96360]
D(KLSE(1)) 0.116438 0.140217 0.073392 0.108146 0.441047 0.096964 0.138489
(0.04542) (0.08726) (0.07064) (0.09466) (0.03949) (0.11433) (0.11109)
[2.56383] [1.60697] [1.03901] [1.14242] [11.1684] [0.84810] [1.24661]
D(KLSE(2)) 0.018597 0.220212 0.084201 0.053586 0.314027 0.121443 0.090320
(0.04498) (0.08642) (0.06996) (0.09376) (0.03911) (0.11323) (0.11003)
[0.41344] [2.54817] [1.20357] [0.57154] [8.02887] [1.07249] [0.82088]
D(RTS(1)) 0.023196 0.126217 0.008078 0.058083 0.014735 0.606387 0.057505
(0.01693) (0.03252) (0.02632) (0.03528) (0.01472) (0.04261) (0.04140)
[1.37052] [3.88150] [0.30686] [1.64643] [1.00123] [14.2319] [1.38899]
D(RTS(2)) 0.011390 0.002582 0.002922 0.042281 0.000620 0.312914 0.080977
(0.01696) (0.03259) (0.02638) (0.03536) (0.01475) (0.04270) (0.04149)
[0.67147] [0.07921] [0.11075] [1.19585] [0.04207] [7.32793] [1.95161]
D(SSE(1)) 0.035456 0.012726 0.083320 0.053372 0.025701 0.043445 0.654479
(0.01708) (0.03282) (0.02657) (0.03561) (0.01486) (0.04301) (0.04179)
[2.07534] [0.38772] [3.13568] [1.49877] [1.73009] [1.01016] [15.6609]
D(SSE(2)) 0.011631 0.032475 0.020510 0.005815 0.025588 0.101096 0.376077
(0.01679) (0.03226) (0.02612) (0.03500) (0.01460) (0.04227) (0.04107)
[0.69269] [1.00666] [0.78536] [0.16616] [1.75253] [2.39166] [9.15622]
C 2.75 105 2.59 106 5.20 106 1.34 105 2.86 106 1.46 105 5.05 105
(0.00034) (0.00065) (0.00053) (0.00071) (0.00029) (0.00085) (0.00083)
[0.08130] [0.00398] [0.00988] [0.01904] [0.00971] [0.01710] [0.06095]
Included observations: 539 after adjustments. Standard error in ( ) and t-statistics in []. CointEq1 = Cointegration
equation 1. Source:
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Table A2. During crisis vector error correction model (V.E.C.M.)
Error correction D(NYSE) D(BSE) D(KOSPI) D(KSE) D(KLSE) D(RTS) D(SSE)
CointEq1 0.003750 0.051890 0.199311 0.008116 0.142931 0.069117 0.098234
(0.01701) (0.02776) (0.01938) (0.02109) (0.01435) (0.02257) (0.03249)
[0.22046] [1.86913] [10.2869] [0.38488] [9.96063] [3.06299] [3.02343]
D(NYSE(1)) 0.576469 0.104380 0.151743 0.050694 0.034399 0.106538 0.047342
(0.04760) (0.07770) (0.05422) (0.05902) (0.04016) (0.06315) (0.09093)
[12.1111] [1.34346] [2.79843] [0.85894] [0.85656] [1.68701] [0.52064]
D(BSE(1)) 0.066675 0.537899 0.066623 0.049838 0.014376 0.085701 0.099587
(0.03094) (0.05051) (0.03525) (0.03837) (0.02611) (0.04106) (0.05912)
[2.15469] [10.6492] [1.88989] [1.29892] [0.55062] [2.08741] [1.68462]
D(KOSPI(1)) 0.022997 0.062298 0.091057 0.083618 0.324966 0.221101 0.157306
(0.05065) (0.08268) (0.05771) (0.06281) (0.04274) (0.06721) (0.09677)
[0.45400] [0.75344] [1.57794] [1.33132] [7.60363] [3.28982] [1.62557]
D(KSE(1)) 0.098743 0.021197 0.001858 0.363143 0.007838 0.089712 0.155173
(0.04506) (0.07355) (0.05133) (0.05587) (0.03802) (0.05978) (0.08608)
[2.19150] [0.28821] [0.03620] [6.49998] [0.20617] [1.50067] [1.80273]
D(KLSE(1)) 0.017893 0.082478 0.388170 0.070060 0.157809 0.096157 0.165467
(0.06631) (0.10824) (0.07554) (0.08222) (0.05595) (0.08798) (0.12668)
[0.26983] [0.76196] [5.13828] [0.85207] [2.82055] [1.09290] [1.30615]
D(RTS(1)) 0.087459 0.078601 0.074439 0.064911 0.089869 0.412245 0.082149
(0.04039) (0.06593) (0.04601) (0.05008) (0.03408) (0.05359) (0.07716)
[2.16539] [1.19223] [1.61782] [1.29613] [2.63721] [7.69290] [1.06467]
D(SSE(1)) 0.038520 0.084747 0.126277 0.039756 0.060030 0.028243 0.457487
(0.02714) (0.04429) (0.03091) (0.03365) (0.02289) (0.03600) (0.05184)
[1.41956] [1.91333] [4.08495] [1.18159] [2.62204] [0.78448] [8.82523]
C 1.59 105 7.53 105 0.000111 1.37 105 6.22 105 5.06 105 0.000126
(0.00093) (0.00152) (0.00106) (0.00115) (0.00078) (0.00123) (0.00177)
[0.01717] [0.04965] [0.10468] [0.01194] [0.07939] [0.04105] [0.07113]
Included observations: 293 after adjustments. Standard error in ( ) and t-statistics in []. Source:
Table A3. Post-crisis vector error correction model (V.E.C.M.)
Error correction D(NYSE) D(BSE) D(KOSPI) D(KSE) D(KLSE) D(RTS) D(SSE)
CointEq1 0.649035 0.156751 0.089127 0.070450 0.304074 1.065089 0.085990
(0.03950) (0.04095) (0.03764) (0.03015) (0.02632) (0.06878) (0.04406)
[16.4320] [3.82781] [2.36757] [2.33682] [11.5527] [15.4847] [1.95150]
D(NYSE(1)) 0.261990 0.168878 0.000149 0.073977 0.194893 0.639906 0.100251
(0.03395) (0.03520) (0.03236) (0.02591) (0.02262) (0.05912) (0.03787)
[7.71694] [4.79790] [0.00460] [2.85480] [8.61469] [10.8235] [2.64694]
D(NYSE(2)) 0.171020 0.127875 0.027723 0.023623 0.080026 0.327538 0.100378
(0.02438) (0.02528) (0.02324) (0.01861) (0.01625) (0.04246) (0.02720)
[7.01482] [5.05912] [1.19314] [1.26949] [4.92590] [7.71484] [3.69069]
D(BSE(1)) 0.023733 0.553670 0.059547 0.003653 0.011764 0.027756 0.000519
(0.02150) (0.02229) (0.02049) (0.01641) (0.01432) (0.03743) (0.02398)
[1.10412] [24.8443] [2.90661] [0.22265] [0.82129] [0.74149] [0.02164]
D(BSE(2)) 0.038403 0.354446 0.055806 0.008756 0.034577 0.077228 0.005035
(0.02139) (0.02218) (0.02039) (0.01633) (0.01425) (0.03725) (0.02386)
[1.79537] [15.9829] [2.73743] [0.53632] [2.42580] [2.07326] [0.21102]
D(KOSPI(1)) 0.156718 0.090084 0.659350 0.015371 0.056658 0.046761 0.049804
(0.02422) (0.02511) (0.02308) (0.01848) (0.01614) (0.04217) (0.02702)
[6.47142] [3.58796] [28.5674] [0.83160] [3.51099] [1.10883] [1.84348]
D(KOSPI(2)) 0.006865 0.074980 0.310329 0.015317 0.045708 0.005438 0.023658
(0.02391) (0.02479) (0.02279) (0.01825) (0.01593) (0.04163) (0.02667)
[0.28717] [3.02511] [13.6198] [0.83941] [2.86914] [0.13062] [0.88705]
D(KSE(1)) 0.080419 0.012781 0.018257 0.592652 0.021264 0.061092 0.004686
(0.03002) (0.03113) (0.02861) (0.02292) (0.02001) (0.05228) (0.03349)
[2.67857] [0.41062] [0.63803] [25.8624] [1.06287] [1.16848] [0.13990]
D(KSE(2)) 0.006145 0.032004 0.000667 0.284296 0.032843 0.020971 0.038934
(0.02999) (0.03109) (0.02858) (0.02289) (0.01998) (0.05222) (0.03346)
[0.20492] [1.02934] [0.02334] [12.4203] [1.64350] [0.40156] [1.16375]
D(KLSE(1)) 0.444660 0.002333 0.048813 0.054844 0.609354 0.697314 0.119683
(continued)
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Table A3. Continued.
Error correction D(NYSE) D(BSE) D(KOSPI) D(KSE) D(KLSE) D(RTS) D(SSE)
(0.04086) (0.04236) (0.03894) (0.03119) (0.02723) (0.07116) (0.04558)
[10.8824] [0.05506] [1.25344] [1.75852] [22.3794] [9.79982] [2.62558]
D(KLSE(2)) 0.217674 0.029219 0.048334 0.002089 0.274642 0.330095 0.065024
(0.03437) (0.03563) (0.03275) (0.02623) (0.02290) (0.05985) (0.03834)
[6.33401] [0.82009] [1.47569] [0.07965] [11.9929] [5.51577] [1.69607]
D(RTS(1)) 0.152842 0.030076 0.055485 0.006967 0.076625 0.286262 0.011605
(0.01610) (0.01669) (0.01534) (0.01229) (0.01073) (0.02803) (0.01796)
[9.49427] [1.80199] [3.61636] [0.56704] [7.14291] [10.2112] [0.64620]
D(RTS(2)) 0.101691 0.061701 0.038631 0.003652 0.044168 0.157143 0.017921
(0.01335) (0.01384) (0.01272) (0.01019) (0.00890) (0.02325) (0.01489)
[7.61779] [4.45820] [3.03638] [0.35848] [4.96527] [6.75987] [1.20337]
D(SSE(1)) 0.033491 0.027968 0.020594 0.016510 0.053605 0.142748 0.673916
(0.02089) (0.02166) (0.01991) (0.01594) (0.01392) (0.03638) (0.02330)
[1.60337] [1.29146] [1.03449] [1.03557] [3.85117] [3.92432] [28.9204]
D(SSE(2)) 0.037268 0.015976 0.002862 0.015428 0.026377 0.084855 0.341201
(0.02018) (0.02093) (0.01924) (0.01541) (0.01345) (0.03515) (0.02252)
[1.84648] [0.76350] [0.14878] [1.00146] [1.96119] [2.41426] [15.1537]
C 1.67 105 2.30 105 1.85 106 4.55 106 7.64 106 9.69 106 2.15 105
(0.00038) (0.00040) (0.00036) (0.00029) (0.00025) (0.00067) (0.00043)
[0.04378] [0.05805] [0.00507] [0.01559] [0.02999] [0.01456] [0.05050]
Included observations: 1766 after adjustments. Standard error in ( ) and t-statistics in []. Source:
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Appendix B
Figure B1. Impulse response Pre-Crisis Period (01/07/2005–30/07/2007)
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Figure B2. Impulse response During-crisis Period (01/08/2007–30/05/2009)
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Figure B3. Impulse response Post-Crisis Period (01/06/2009–30/06/2015).
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